Ireland v Wales Review: Ireland Capitalise on Wales’ Mistakes, Pivac’s Mark on the Team

The King is dead, long live the King.

The Schmidt era may have come to an end, but this victory was straight out of the Schmidt playbook.

We’ve talked a lot about how Ireland’s winning formula is based on the ‘pressure game’, which means applying pressure to the opposition through kicking, the breakdown, driving mauls and close carrying, until they break. This was a classic example of those tactics.

Ireland thrive on field positions in the opposition 22 and there is no better team at converting these opportunities in to points. The best way to negate these tactics, is to not give them the field position in the first place, which is exactly what Wales failed to do, due to a number of individual errors.

1st try: Jordan Larmour

The origins of this try came from a defensive error in midfield from George North. which allowed Sexton to get on the outside of him and create a 3 on 1 overlap.

We wrote last week about North’s defensive vulnerabilities in reading the game in the 13 channel, and this is exactly where he found himself, as he misread the Irish movement and came in for the ball, allowing Sexton to slip around the back of him.

This took Ireland deep in to Wales territory, but Wales stole the ball back, only to be penalised for holding on in contact. From the 5m lineout, Wales did some great work in defending the attacking maul, and from the ensuing scrum Dan Biggar’s clearing kick only found the line 10m out from the Wales try line.

Wales’ 1st mistake allowed Ireland the deep field position, while 2 more individuals errors meant Wales failed to clear their lines. Ireland’s carrying game kicked in to action while Nick Tompkins’ defensive error in over-committing to the wide channel allowed Larmour space on the inside.

2nd try: Tadhg Furlong try

Tomos Williams was a standout player in Cardiff last week. In Dublin though, he looked way off form, with weak tackles, some sloppy passing and this calamitous dropped pass, that gave Ireland the scrum, from which Furlong bundled over from the trademark Irish 3 man pre-bound carries.

 

3rd try: Josh van der Flier

Wales were still in the game with 44 minutes on the clock, and with an opportunity to clear the ball, they were still well positioned in the game.

Instead, Ireland stole the ball at the lineout and set up their forward pods again. From the resulting penalty, they easily drove through the Welsh maul defence for a simple try.

 

4th try: Andrew Conway

The game is lost for Wales. Gareth Davies tries a blind side run from deep his his 22 and a combination of a poor pass and some questionable handling, means the ball is dropped and Ireland are awarded a scrum.

You’ve probably guess the pattern by now. Ireland’s forward pods make the hard hards before opening up space for Conway on the wing. Clinical, accurate rugby.

In all 4 scenarios, Wales had the opportunity to clear the ball and force Ireland to play from deep, where they are far less potent.

These basic errors littered Wales’ play through the match.

 

Wales’ basic errors

Coming out after half time, Wales would have felt they were in the game, and if the errors could be cut out, their attacking play would give them the advantage.

Instead, it took just a minute for the first individual error, as the usually dependable Dan Biggar fumbled a pass from a long Conor Murray clearing kick.

Biggar recovers well, but after one phase, Tomos Williams throws a horrible pass, which Nick Tompkins fails to gather and Ireland are awarded a scrum.

This final example sums up Wales’ performance, but also nicely links us to the influence Pivac is having on the team.

Ireland move the ball wide and kick long. Parkes covers the kick but instead of taking the tackle, securing the ball and then attempting to clear long down the field, he tries a very high risk pass out of the tackle.

The pass is deemed forward, and once again Wales gift Ireland an attacking field position exactly where they want to be to launch their forwards.

 

Pivac’s Wales

We need to remember that Wales were chasing the game when Parkes made this decision, but it’s a nice example of how Pivac wants to play the game and the risks that come with his approach.

Anyone who watched the Scarlets under Pivac, will know that his style is at the opposite end of the spectrum to his predecessor Warren Gatland. Where Gatland liked structure and predictability, Pivac’s team have been happy to take risks and seek an unstructured game.

Against Italy, we saw all the risk taking come off. Against Ireland, the offloads and forced passes were often going to ground, or in some cases Irish players.

There is nothing wrong with offloading out of contact at the right time, as we saw for Tomos Williams’ try in the first half. The challenge is instilling an off-loading mindset in to a group of players, while ensuring that the decision to offload is made at the right time and the right place.

There may be times when it is better to take contact; for example when the team is retreating and an offload just puts another player under pressure, or in the Parkes example when a mistake will give the opposition an attacking opportunity.

In the two 6 Nations games, we have seen Pivac’s influence on the team start to grow. Offloading is one example, having the back row running with the ball in wider channels is another. They are now employing an inside runner off the outside half, to keep the inside defence keen. Wales also seem to be playing narrower in defence. We will come to these tactics in more detail later in the tournament.

One aspect of Wales’ game that is new and did work was the “out to in” wide carries.

“Out to in” carries

Gatland’s Wales tended to push their forward carriers in straight lines, fairly close to the breakdown. In contrast, Pivac’s Wales often employed a wider pass to a forward (or sometimes a back) who was running a line from outside, to back infield.

Hadleigh Parkes hit an out to in line for his try scoring opportunity, where he just lost the ball in contact, but we also saw the tactic used in phase play further out from Ireland’s line.

Here is Parkes again with the same line.

Here is Dillon Lewis with the same line.

Wales had a lot of joy with this approach.

The benefits of the tactic is that teams usually push on to the first receiver, with those defenders further out often standing deeper and with bigger gaps between each player. Runners can then target these gaps and the more passive defence.

The other benefit is that defenders tend to look in, towards the ball and aren’t always aware of angled runs from outside their view.

It’s a good tactic and one that we will watch in the 6 Nations.

 

Pivac verdict

It’s far too early to judge Pivac’s tenure.

We know that Shaun Edwards is a great defence coach but even he failed to keep Italy scoreless, which was what this Welsh team achieved last week.

Wales under Gatland and Edward also suffered from Ireland’s pressure game in Dublin on a couple of occasions, indeed here’s a reminder of Wales failing to deal with Ireland pre-bound pods in Dublin 2 years ago.

We can see aspects of Wales’ offensive game starting to evolve. It was just the sheer weight of individual errors that led to Ireland’s dominance yesterday, rather than any systemic issue with Wales’ play.

The question is, are those errors due to the new style of play, Ireland’s pressure or just a bad day at the office for a number of players? We should have more answers as this tournament progresses.

 

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Rugby’s Greatest Tries Should Have Been Disallowed! Rugby in a World Before the TMO.

As the 2020 6 Nations rumbles on, social media is awash with footage of the greatest tries the tournament has seen. Jinking outside halves, flying wingers, switch moves and no shortage of attacking play; rugby as it should be played.

One particular clip that caught the eye was Phil Bennett’s spectacular try in the 1977 Scotland v Wales fixture, as the mercurial fly half finishes off an 80 metre move under the posts.

 

But hang on…..looking at this try with the eye of the modern rugby viewer, we can’t help but notice a couple of those passes looked a bit marginal.

Rugby was a different beast back in the amateur days of the 1970s, with no ability for referees to view replays and no Third Match Official (TMO) sitting in a box, watching play back for offences.

So how would the greatest tries in rugby history be assessed under the modern scrutiny from the TMO? Let’s start with Bennett’s try.

 

Phil Bennett (Scotland v Wales 1977)

“Check, check…..it’s Ben Skeen here”…..

The TMO would probably want to look at two passes in the build up to Bennett’s try.

The first is the pass from Bennett to David Burcher.  As we can see from the clip, the ball travels a long way forward from the point of release, but of course it’s the direction of hands that we use as a guide as to what constitutes forward.

Bennett’s hands look like they are pointing forward and the ball comes out of the hands in a forward direction.

Burcher then throws a one handed over-head pass that also has the hint of the forward pass about it (see below).

TMO decision: No try. Forward pass. Scrum to Scotland on half way line.

 

Gareth Edwards (Barbarians v New Zealand, 1973)

Often known as the greatest try of all time, we poked a bit of fun at this in an article a couple of years ago.

It’s a beautiful try that combines backs and forwards in a flowing move from one end of the pitch to the other.

 

If this was being refereed in a 2020 game, the move may well have been brought to a halt deep in the Barbarian’s 22, when JPR Williams is on the receiving end of a neck high tackle.

As play develops, we see some lovely interplay between forwards and backs and the ball being kept alive in contact. But what’s this…..Quinnell to Edwards….

Even without the advent of the TMO, this pass should really have been picked up by the referee.

Verdict: No try. Forward pass. No advantage for the high tackle, penalty to the Barbarians in their 22m.

 

Shane Williams (Wales v Scotland, 2010)

With 3 minutes remaining Scotland led Wales by 10 points. What transpired was rugby’s greatest ever come back, which was sealed by Shane Williams dotting down under the posts after a multi-phase attack from deep in the Welsh half.

Why did Stephen Jones kick the ball cross-field when he had a number of players out wide? Who knows, but the bounce of the ball falls for Wales and as Lee Byrne gathers the ball and is tackled, he throws a forward pass to Leigh Halfpenny, who has only just got up off the floor.

Verdict: No try. Forward pass. Scrum to Scotland.

 

Serge Blanco (France v Australia, 1987)

It was a try that showed French rugby at it’s best, as forwards and backs swept down the field, culminating in Serge Blanco going over in the corner to put France in to the final of the inaugural Rugby World Cup.

 

Apart from a nasty no-arms tackles from Australia, it was the pace of France’s number 4 (Alain Lorieux) to follow up Patrice Lagisquet’s kick that caught the key. How did he put pressure on Australia in midfield? It’s because he was about 2 metres in front of the kick.

 

Verdict: No try. Offside. Penalty to Australia.

 

The TMO is a mainstay of modern, professional rugby. It was brought in to highlight obvious infringements that the match officials missed, but has this made rugby a better spectacle?

Would rugby in the 1970s and 1980s have been better if the TMO had been used? Imagine a rugby history where these tries had been disallowed?

 

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Who Played What? Minutes of Rugby Played by England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales’ Test Players in 2018/19 season

One of the themes that we have focused on over the last few seasons has been the number of games – and minutes played, by test players in the 6 Nations.

Firstly, let’s have a quick recap on the 2017/18 patterns.

2017/18 season

After the 2017 British and Irish Lions tour to New Zealand, it was noticeable how the rest periods for key Lions’ players following the tour, differed by nation.

The full article is here, but what is shows is that the Irish players involved in the test series were given about 83/84 days’ rest before their domestic return in the 2017/18 season.  By contrast, the English contingent had between 55 and 71 days’ break, with the Welsh test Lions falling somewhere between the two (57 to 76).

As the 2017/18 season evolved, we witnessed Ireland win a Grand Slam, with a dominant display against a lethargic England at Twickenham.

Our analysis had already highlighted that Ireland’s key players had been given a much longer break following the Lions tour, but this article went on to look at the minutes played by the respective teams in that Twickenham game.

We found that on average, each of the Ireland players who took to the pitch on the final 6 Nations weekend against England, had played 4.5 games fewer than their English counterparts. 

Did a combination of the longer recovery plus the lighter playing load during the season play a part in Ireland’s Grand Slam?

The analysis also highlighted that the two teams’ players, played roughly the same amount of test and European rugby, but there was a huge difference in the minutes played in the respective domestic leagues.

England’s players had played on average 300 minutes more domestic rugby than their Irish counterparts.

By the end of the season, we still saw a disparity in the minutes played by the two Ireland and England test teams. As this article explains in more detail, by the end of the season the players from England had played on average, 319 minutes more rugby than their Irish counterparts.  This is nearly 4 full games of rugby.

If we look at the total minutes played by players from both squads across the season, it shows only 4 Irish players make it in to the top 20.

 

2018/19 season – 6 Nations

The pattern of longer summer rests for Ireland’s players continued.

Ireland and England both played their final summer test on the same day (23rd June 2018), and yet on the first weekend of the new 2018/19 Pro14 season, just 2 of the Ireland squad in the final summer test played some game minutes.

This contrasts with 23 of England’s squad playing on the same weekend.

At the start of the 2019 6 Nations, we took a look at the starting XV selections for the first game of the tournament and calculated how many minutes each of the starting teams had played in the season to date.

The data showed that Ireland’s players had played just 830 minutes, England’s 1038 and Wales’ 918.

The pattern is again clear; Ireland’s players play fewer games and minutes than England’s.

This time it was England who made Ireland look devoid of ideas and lacking intensity, as they secured a comfortable win in game week 1 in Dublin.

However, once again, England’s form tailed off towards the end of the tournament as they were beaten in Cardiff in game week 3, before just about managing a draw in Twickenham against a resurgent 2nd half Scotland in the final tournament game.

In our article, we asked “it will be interesting to see of England’s form can be maintained through the 6 Nations”.

The answer was that they couldn’t maintain the form. How much of this is down to England’s player management; particularly when the same group of players have to perform 4 or 5 times in 7 weeks?

Wales ultimately won the Grand Slam. They may not rest their players as much as Ireland’s but the data shows that both their minutes and games played figures are way below England’s and France’s. How much advantage does this give them?

 

2018/19 full season 

After looking at the figures leading up to the 6 Nations, we then went on to calculate the games and minutes played across the whole season, for all test players from England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

All 4 teams played 9 test matches, with Ireland using 42 players, Scotland and Wales 41 and England 39.

 

All squad members 

Let’s first look at the data for all players who played a test during the season – including those that played all 9 games, to those that played in just 1 fixture.

This table below shows the number of games that the squad members played in, across the season; test, domestic and European rugby.

The following table looks at the number of minutes played:

Of course, it’s worth mentioning that there are numerous explanations for each of these data points, from players having long periods out due to injuries, to certain nations having teams that go further in European competitions, to strategic decisions to rest certain players.

What do the tables tell us?

England’s test players over the season played the most minutes and the most games, compared to the other 3 nations. Wales played the fewest.

This data considers all squad members, but what would the figures look like if we split the squad by number of tests played during the season? Does the pattern hold if we only look at each nation’s leading test players?

 

Players with 7-9 caps in the season

By focusing on the players with 7 to 9 caps during the season, we can determine the player management approach for each team’s key players.

Here are the average minutes played in total and the breakdown for each competition.

The first thing that stands out is that the Wales, Ireland and Scotland average is very similar, even though the make up of the total average minutes figure varies; Wales’ players played fewer European minutes, while Ireland’s play relatively few games in the Pro14.

England’s average at 1809 minutes, is 326 minutes higher than Wales’ figure and 383 higher than Scotland’s. This equates to about 4 to 5 full games of rugby more per season or about 22% more rugby than Wales’ senior players.

The data also shows us that with 20 players in this category, Wales rely on a small number of players to shoulder the playing burden. This should benefit Wales through familiarity, but it does also highlight Wales’ small playing pool.

The final area we will focus on for this group is to determine which players played the most over the season,

The graph below shows the overall rankings for total minutes played over the season for each team’s key players.

The graph makes interesting reading. There are 8 England players, 6 from Wales, 5 from Scotland and one solitary Irishman.

6 of the top 7 spots are taken by English players, with Saracens taking 3 of the top 6 spots (Daly was a Wasps player in 2018/19). If the Vunipola brothers had been fit all season, they may also have appeared on this list.

Again we see Ireland’s player management approach at work, with many of their top players being carefully managed throughout the season.

Interestingly, two of the Welsh entries play for English club teams, which will have pushed up their domestic minutes through the season.

 

Do minutes matter?

The data has shown us that England’s players started the season earlier than their rivals, they then went on to play on average, more minutes than the other 3 teams by some distance and finally their top players play far more rugby than other nations’ key players.

At the other end of the spectrum, Ireland’s star names are carefully managed throughout the season, meaning they play fewer minutes than England’s on average and their top players play fewer minutes than their English counterparts.

Wales and Scotland sit in the middle, with a low average minutes played figure for their top players (at a similar level to Ireland’s) but some of their top players take on a reasonable playing burden.

Ultimately, it was Wales who won the 6 Nations and who looked fresh and purposeful in the critical games against Ireland and England. Had the lack of meaningful games in Europe by Wales’ regions actually helped the preparation of the national team?

How much difference these player management plans make is open to debate. It may also be the case that we will not see the impacts on player welfare until later in their careers.

England and Saracens’ key players like Farrell, George, Kruis and Itoje have had a number of years of playing a great deal of rugby.  They may be well recompensed for their labour, but will this workload affect their ability to play as they get older? Or  are they conditioned and have the physiology to withstand the demands of elite rugby for years on end?

 

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Pro14, Premiership, Top 14 and Super Rugby Twitter Followers by Team. Where Does Your Team Come on the Twitter Followers League Table?

Here is the 3rd annual analysis of Twitter followers of clubs in rugby’s 4 main professional leagues.

Does this give us a unique insight in to the varying fortunes of each league, can we use it as a proxy for the commercial clout of the respective teams……or is it just a load of pointless tables that are only of interest to people who like geeky rugby tables?

Probably the latter, but here you go……

Twitter followers for the major professional leagues as at 6th January 2020.

 

Pro14

(1) Total number of followers.

There are no real changes to the Pro14 table.

The two Italian teams continue to battle each other towards the foot of the table, while Connacht – who passed Cardiff Blues in 2019, extend their lead over the Welsh region.

 

 

(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020

 

(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase

 

Gallagher Premiership

(1) Total number of followers

There are no changes in the top 4 places in the table, compared to 2019.

Wasps have slipped one place from 5th to 6th, while Exeter have moved down one place from 6th to 7th. Saracens have jumped from 7th to 5th.

 

 

(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020

 

(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase

 

Top 14

(1) Total number of followers

 

(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020

Brive and Bayonne are not included in this table.

 

 

(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase

Brive and Bayonne are not included in this table

 

Super Rugby

(1) Total number of followers

Comparing 2019 to 2020, there have been very few changes but the big story is the Sunwolves, off the back of the Rugby World Cup, leaping from 15th place to 12th.

The Jaguares are also starting to put pressure on the Bulls for the 3rd spot.

 

(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020

 

(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase

 

 

Consolidated – Total Followers

Including a comparison with 2019 and the number of places moved, where applicable.

Biggest Risers:

Sunwolves – 8 places

Bristol Bears – 3

Saracens/Glasgow – 2

Various – 1

 

Biggest Fallers:

Brumbies – 3 places

Dragons/Exeter/Leicester/Northampton/Bath/Wasps/Racing 92 – 2 places

 

Changes in Consolidated Table Positions from 2019 to 2020 by Nation:

Excludes teams that were promoted for the 2019/20 season.

 

Changes in Consolidated Table Positions from 2019 to 2020 by League:

Excludes teams that were promoted for the 2019/20 season.

 

Analysis by League

 

 

 

 

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Exit strategies from the 22. Risk and Reward and why Japan and Australia got it Wrong

We all want to watch exciting rugby.  Whether this be players offloading, backs running at pace and cutting great angles, or forwards working together in close driving pods. These sorts of tactics are great to watch, but they often aren’t the sorts of tactics that wins games.

Two of the most attractive teams to watch in this World Cup have been Japan and Australia and yet both of them crashed out of the tournament last weekend. For Japan, this has been an exceptional tournament and they have rightly been lauded for their approach to the game. In contrast, Australia return home having failed to reach their pre-tournament targets.

One thing they had in common on the weekend, was a willingness to run the ball and play phases from their own 22, which often resulted in them putting themselves under pressure, which led to the opposition scoring points.

The way the breakdown is refereed at the elite level, means the awarding of penalties for offences is a lottery. By playing multiple phases in their own 22, teams are increasing the chances of a ball handling error but also increasing the risk of the referee awarding a penalty against them at the breakdown, which will often lead to points being scored.

This isn’t to say that teams should just clear the ball at the first opportunity, but the risk should only be taken if there is a clear reward.

If a team can see they have a numerical advantage by moving the ball wide from deep, then by all means take the chance and move the ball. What teams shouldn’t do though is take the risk of multiple phases in their own 22, when the rewards are not clear and obvious.

In this article we will look at Japan’s errors early in the game against South Africa and revist Australia’s woeful deep play in their quarter final against England.

 

Japan v South Africa

The opening minutes of any game are crucial. If you can grab the initiative, through making big hits on the opposition or creating point scoring opportunities, this can often set the tone for the game as a whole. Think of Wales early points against Australia from the kick off as a good example.

Japan’s opening minute against South Africa set the tone, for all the wrong reasons, as we will see from the clip below. The thought process from the Japanese coaching team was obvious though – they wanted to take risks and try and move the point of attack to the wider channels.

This is what they opted to play on the kick return. Japan’s first receiver took the ball in to contact and after it was recycled they played the ball to their right:

This was a planned move. Japan’s inside centre (Nakamura) comes in to the first receiver channel, before passing to the playmaker Tamura to make the cross-field kick. We can also see that Japan have placed two of their back row players (Leitch and Labuschagne) in the wide channel to help with the next phase of play.

Japan got lucky. Matsushima could have been penalised for jumping in to the South African winger and when the ball bobbled free, it was a Japanese player who picked it up.

It was a very high risk strategy, but what was the reward on offer? The Springbok defence was organised and set, there was little space out wide and even if Matsushima had caught the ball, Mapimpi would have made a simple tackle.

It was a poorly thought out move, that didn’t stick to the risk-reward principles; there was far too much risk, for little potential reward.

Japan eventually clear the ball but just 2 minutes in to the game they have a lineout 30 metres out from their own line. They move the ball wide and then come back on the short side.

Tamura has plenty of time to put boot to ball and ease the pressure. Instead he throws a high risk pass, off his weak hand, which ends up drifting metres forward. Given the context of the game at that point, the difficulty of the pass and the potential upside (a hooker on the wing, with the ball 80 metres from the South Africa try line), this was the wrong option to play.

From the resulting scrum, some poor Japanese defence allows Mapimpi to cross for a try.

 

England v Australia

 

In our review article to this game, we highlighted how Australia like to play from deep through multiple phases and this was potentially an area England could capitalise on. It wasn’t a surprise therefore, to see Australia continue with this tactic and England profit from Australia’s mistakes.

With 12 minutes on the clock, England restart long and Australia’s number 8 (Isi Naisarani) takes the ball in to contact. After a strong tackle from Underhill, Australia reset and have the opportunity to kick the ball long.

Instead of that option, they do this:

Australia’s forwards come around the corner to take the ball and eventually their prop (Ala’alatoa drops the ball), giving England a great attacking scrum in front of the posts. Several phases later only some last ditch Australian tackling prevents England from scoring a try.

In our second clip we see England again restarting after a successful Australian penalty.

It’s the same pattern, as the initial carrier sets up a ruck before Australia’s forwards come around the corner and try and punch through the middle (making the angle for the clearing kick more difficult). This time Kurtley Beale decides to chip the ball out of his own 22 and straight in to the hands of May!

If the objective of Australia’s exit strategy is to heap as much pressure on themselves, then they are doing a good job!

On 33 minutes, Australia play 4 phases deep in their own 22 before deciding to make a clearing kick.

The final clip shows our now familiar Aussie clearing pattern, as a ruck is set up before Genia passes the ball in to midfield. This time they do attempt a clearing kick, but Lealiifano is under so much pressure, and is so far from the touchline that Hodge can just be bundled in to touch for an England lineout in an attacking position.

 

Getting the Risk v Reward balance right

If we look at these three Australian examples if their standard exit strategy it’s clear that they are high risk options, than ended up giving England good field position to attack from. What’s not clear is what the potential reward was?

A better kicking angle? A break from the forward carriers 90 metres from England’s line? The ability to make space for their backs to make a long range attack?

Who knows, but now Cheika has moved on from the Australia role, we expect to see this tactic quickly dropped as their default position.

 

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6 Tactics Japan Used To Beat Ireland

This wasn’t supposed to happen.  We all wanted Japan to have a successful World Cup, as the hosts and also as a developing tier 2 team, but very few of us would have predicted that Japan would beat one of the world’s top teams.

Indeed, the opening of the game followed the script, with Ireland kicking well, driving lineouts and with their forward carriers punching big holes. After 23 minutes Ireland looked comfortable and were leading 12-3. From that point on Japan’s strategy kicked in to place and little by little they inched back in to the game.

We know Japan isn’t blessed with the most physical side in world rugby, so their strategy and tactics have to be developed with this in mind. Ireland’s strengths are in pressurising the opposition through forward carries, over the ball at the breakdown and through accurate kicking.

These two factors meant that Japan had to play a game with pace, accuracy and one that attempted to nullify Ireland’s breakdown presence.  Here are 6 tactics they used that helped them win the game.

 

(1) Quick ball presentation at breakdown

Quick ball is the best ball to attack with, as the defence doesn’t have time to properly set and reorganise.  Japan often achieved fast ball through a number of tactics, including the ball carrier holding the ball up for the scrum half and having their clearing players remove the defenders from over the ball and beyond the ruck.

Here are 3 examples of excellent fast ball.

 

(2) Doing the basics accurately

Japan were impressive in doing the basics of rugby well.

In the first example, we see Japan play a ball to a single runner who provides a better angle for the clearing kick. By opening up the angle they were able to make a 45 metre gain with the touchfinder.

Japan didn’t often employ the box kick, but this example shows a well placed kick lead to a kickable penalty awarded to them.

Japan’s scrum also held up well and the put pressure on Ireland’s lineout. These building blocks of the game generally went well for Japan.

 

(3) Tackle low

It sounds obvious, but it’s common for the first tackler in a defensive line to go high and target the ball or try and prevent an offload. Japan often put two players in to the tackle, with the first one going very low to halt the runner and the second aiming high to slow down the ball.

This aggressive line speed, couple with good, low tackles nullified a lot of Ireland’s carrying, which is such a strong part of their game.

 

(4) Clear out from the side

Every team does it in professional rugby, but Japan made the illegal side clear out at the breakdown an art form in this game. As with the tackle technique, we often saw 2 clearing players support the Japanese ball carrier, neither of which had any intent to enter through the gate with both arrowing in the side against the jackal.

This negated another area of strength for Ireland and as the game progressed you could see Ireland stand off more and more tackles, effectively gifting Japan the ball at the breakdown. The decision seemed to be that it was better to not compete and fill the defensive line, rather than waste bodies over the ball who were being easily cleaned out.

 

(5) Release and pick up

This has been one of the main features of this World Cup, where a carrier is tackled, they immediately release the ball, then get back to their feet and pick the ball up to continue the drive.

This speeds up the game, helps to identify any weak spots around the breakdown and also forces the defending team to keep their defence narrow, which may lead to more space out wide.

 

(6) Move the ball away from the scrum

Japan know their scrum isn’t a weapon, so why keep the ball longer in the scrum than they need to? These examples show the ball being hooked back, often through “channel 1”, which provides fast ball that the Japanese scrum halves quickly moved away.

 

This was an excellent performance from Japan, that was built on plenty of heart and commitment but there was a lot of thought and tactical development that went in to the victory.

By speeding the game up and nullifying Ireland’s jackal and forward carriers they accentuated their strengths and reduced Ireland’s opportunities to score points. Clever coaching.

 

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A world in union or a boys’ club for the few? A look at how the Rugby World Cup has failed to spread elite rugby from its original powers

The Rugby World Cup is now over 30 years old. What started off as a fairly low key tournament is now one of sport’s major events, with pictures being beamed in to the lounges of countless countries across the globe.

The World Cup has been a commercial success and we will be bombarded with images and graphics over the next few weeks from World Rugby, telling us how many TV viewers, sponsorship deals and new players they have in various regions. These figures are not in doubt and the game’s organisers should be applauded for the continued commercial growth of the sport’s biggest tournament.

If we look at what has developed on the field of play, we see a different picture. The World Cup was supposed to be the catalyst for the growth and development of the game across the world, with new countries coming in to challenge the old nations and the game being spread to all 4 corners of the planet.

30 years on we will look at how the dominant powers on the field haven’t changed and how tier 2 nations have not only failed to catch up, they have fallen further behind.

 

Rugby’s dominant powers

A simple way of looking at how on-field success has changed (or not) since the original World Cup is to have a look at which teams have qualified for the latter stages of the tournament.

The table below shows the teams that have reached the quarter finals (red square), semi finals (grey) and final (gold) for each edition of the tournament:

A quick glance at the chart tells us that several teams have always made the knockout stages (New Zealand, Australia and France), while South Africa – who entered in 1995, have also always made the latter stages in the tournaments they have competed in.

England and Scotland have missed 1 tournament each and Ireland just two.

The tier 2 nations have made just 5 appearances in the quarter finals (Samoa and Fiji twice and Canada once). Tellingly, 4 of these appearances were in the earlier editions, with Fiji’s 2007 appearance the only tier 2 representation since 1995.

The teams that have filled the knockout spots in the first few tournaments are exactly the same teams that will do so in Japan, except for the emergence of Argentina. The Pumas are the only nation that has managed to make the leap from a “developing” rugby nation to one that can regularly trouble the big guns on the World Cup stage.

If this is a measure of the success of spreading the game to smaller nations, we have to say it has been a failure. In reality, the 9 top teams in the world are competing for 8 places.

 

Is the gap closing between tier 1 and tier 2?

During the 2015 World Cup, World Rugby’s Chief Executive Brett Gosper promised to work to close the gap between tier 1 and tier 2 nations, but how big is the gap and how has this changed over the last 30 years?

To carry out this analysis we have stripped out the results from Italy and Argentina, as both these teams started the period as tier 2 nations before being upgraded to tier 1. Back in 1987 Argentina were being hammered by 30 points against the All Blacks and Italy lost by 70-6 to the same team.

In the first editions of the tournament a try was also only worth 4 points, so the results have been adjusted to put all games on a consistent basis, with a try worth 5 points.

If we look at the average points scored by the tier 1 teams in their games against tier 2, we get the following chart:

If we drew a trendline through the data we would see a slope up to the 2003 edition and then a gradual decline. It is also worth noting that the first 3 tournaments had just 16 teams, before it was expanded to 20.

The 2003 version stands out as the peak tier 1 figure, when we saw Australia beat Namibia 142-0, England 111 – 13 Uruguay and New Zealand scoring 91 points against Tonga. The gap between tier 1 and tier 2 was huge.

Turning our attention to how many points the tier 2 nations scored on average, we can see a quite different pattern:

 

The data shows a fairly flat line, without a huge variation in points scored across the 8 tournaments. A 5.3 point difference between the highest and lowest data figure is very small, particularly when compared to the 23 point variation in average points scored by tier 1.

If we subtract the tier 1 score from the tier 2 score we get the points difference by tournament:

It is also worth mentioning that some of these trends will be due to the changing nature of the game itself and not necessarily the difference in the relative strength of tier 1 and tier 2.

For example, rugby in the early 1990s was a far slower, more set piece oriented game than the version we have seen over the last 5+ years. This change in skills, tactics and mindset will explain some of the relative changes in the points teams score (and concede).

The graphic tells us that the gap between tier 1 and tier 2 grew between the 1991 edition and 2003.

It’s probably not a coincidence that this period straddled the move from an “amateur” game to one that was openly professional. By 2003, many of the the original rugby powers were running full time outfits, with world class support and facilities. In many cases they were playing against amateurs, who played rugby as a hobby rather than a career.

Since 2003, the trend has been for these games to be closer, with the average points difference in 2015 being the lowest since 1991. This is probably due to the progress made by tier 2 nations in their coaching and preparation, and also that a large number of tier 2 players now ply their trade, as professionals, in the top leagues in world rugby.

There are some reasons to be positive looking at this data, with the gap closing between the top teams and the developing nations, however the reality is that even a 32 point difference means the game is not a competitive one. We may enjoy watching the rugby on show, but we are in no doubt which team will win.

Over the 8 tournaments, we have only seen 5 victories by a tier 2 team against a tier 1 nation (excluding the results from Italy and Argentina).

 

World Cup failure

The sport’s governing body has failed in its responsibility to spread and develop the game from its traditional heartlands, to a group of new nations that can compete with the best.

Indeed, Argentina are the only nation that have made large strides in their competitiveness since the 1987 World Cup.

The advent of professionalism has allowed the tier 1 nations to further utilise their advantages in playing numbers and commercial power, while tier 2 teams find themselves less likely to secure a knock out spot in the 2019 edition than they did way back in 1987.

A quick look at the odds for this weekend’s games clearly indicates the problem the game has with closing the gap – England have a 40 point handicap against Tonga and Italy 30 points against Namibia. The days of 100+ point defeats may be over but we are still a long way from seeing a real break through from tier 2 nations.

The World Cup has been a commercial success, but for it to truly deliver on its objectives World Rugby needs to expand the playing base so we have genuine contenders to those who sit at the top table. So far it has failed to do this.

 

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The World Cup match schedule – Japan benefit while the USA suffers. Does the tournament programme still favour tier 1 nations?

Perhaps it’s a sign of creeping old age, but it’s a bit of a shock that nearly 4 years have elapsed since the last Rugby World Cup was held in England and we now stand on the cusp of the 2019 edition in Japan.

Back in 2015, we took a close look at the tournament fixture list to see how the games were scheduled and to identify which teams benefited – or were hampered, by the organiser’s arrangements.

You can read the complete article here, but the key findings were:

• The schedule benefited England, Ireland and Italy in terms of giving them the best recovery times and the longest period between the first and last pool games
• The schedule was skewed toward the tier 1 nations. Four of the five teams that had 19 full rest days between their first and last fixtures were tier 1 nations (Ireland, England, Italy and France)

The chart below gives more detail on the second finding:

Despite originally defending the 2015 schedule, World Rugby’s Brett Gosper then came out and agreed that they would seek to make the 2019 schedule a fairer one, with both tier 1 and tier 2 nations sharing the burden of shorter turnarounds.

This article will look in detail at the 2019 schedule and determine who are the winners and losers and if Gosper has indeed made the schedule fairer to tier 2 nations.

 

Total number of full rest days between first and last pool game

With the attritional nature of rugby, the commercial realities of having the bigger teams playing at the best times of day for home TV audiences and the need to try and ensure a level playing field, coming up with a schedule for the World Cup is always going to have its challenges.

The tournament kicks off with Japan versus Russia on a Friday evening, while some teams (Canada and the USA) won’t take to the pitch for the first time until the following Thursday.

One of the key measures to look at to assess the fairness of the schedule is the number of complete rest days between a team’s opening and closing fixture, which is shown on the chart below:

The obvious team that stands out is Japan!  A bit like the 2015 arrangement, World Rugby have again been very generous to the host nation and given them the longest rest period of all the competing teams.

At the opposite end of the spectrum – with 6 fewer full rest days than Japan, we have the unlucky South Africa (who should have a squad to cope with the demands of such a restricted schedule), Canada and the USA.

With the two north American teams starting their campaign nearly a week after Japan, the schedule hasn’t been amended to allow them to make some of these days back. A tough World Cup campaign just got a lot tougher.

The coloured blobs representing the tier 1/2 split, also tells us that apart from a few outliers, the tier 1 nations are getting about 17 or 18 full rest days, while the bulk of tier 2 are having to make do with 14 to 16.

If we average out the rest days for the 2019 tournament, we can see that tier 1 nations have an average of 16.8 days’ rest, while tier 2 will have 16 days to recuperate. The same figures for the 2015 tournament were 17 and 16 respectively.

 

Shortest number of full rest days between pool fixtures

Another challenge of the condensed World Cup schedule is having to play two games in short succession.

Back in 2015, the vast majority of the teams had to cope with one 3 or 4 day turnaround, apart from Italy, Ireland and England, who had the luxury of 6 days full rest as their shortest turnaround period.

How do the figures look for 2019?

As predicted, Japan have a favourable draw, with the shortest turnaround between 2 of their games being 6 days.  With fixtures on a Friday evening (opening game), two on a Saturday and one on a Sunday, it’s obvious that World Rugby want to give the host team as much chance as possible to be successful on the pitch and attract viewers off it.

Unlike the 2015 chart, it is nice to see that half of the tier 2 nations have at least avoided the “3 day turnaround pot”. This extra day or two may not turn them in to world beaters but it does at least attempt to make them as competitive on the field as they can be, which has to be good for the game.

 

A mixed review

4 years on from the 2015 World Cup, it is accurate to say there have been some improvements in the scheduling to help the tier 2 nations but tier 1 nations are still having longer breaks between their first and last fixtures, which doesn’t help provide a level playing field.

In the next article, we will look in detail at each team’s schedule and determine which nations have the best and which have the worst.

In a tournament with matches that will often be decided by fine margins, the importance of a nation’s schedule and how their team selection will be organised to maximise their chances of victory, will be key.

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World Rugby’s “Nations Championship” – 10 Key Challenges for the Tournament

The concept of the Nations Championship has been bubbling away in the background before bursting in to life recently with a leaked article from the New Zealand Herald.  The majority of the rugby world took exception to World Rugby’s (WR’s) plans, with the primary issue raised around the ring fencing of the top division, which would prevent tier 2 nations moving up and down the leagues.

This week World Rugby met again (mostly the tier 1 nations!) to consider the negative feedback received from the leaked article and to refine the current proposal. The main changes were that the semi-final play off was going to be scrapped and that there would be relegation and promotion between the divisions.

This article will look at the main challenges that the tournament faces.

 

What is the Nations Championship?

The details can be found here  but the essence of the tournament is to use the existing test level tournaments – the 6 Nations and Rugby Championship, along with the tests in the July and November test windows to form a single global tournament that will see a single champion crowned the “Nations Champion”.

The first major change is that 2 more teams would be added to the Rugby Championship – to take that tournament up to 6 teams, that would be based on the World Rugby rankings – currently this would be Fiji and Japan.

World Rugby claim that the tournament would “secure a strong and sustainable competition and financial platform for unions and a true opportunity for emerging nations to develop and compete at the highest level”.  The cynics amongst us however, would claim the primary aim is to share the lucrative TV income from the northern hemisphere with the relatively poorer southern nations.

The player drain from south to north continues to grow, drawn by the salaries on offer in England and France. By tapping in to the revenues in the north, the southern unions hope to be able to better compete in the market for the game’s top stars.

The tournament though faces considerable challenges; here are the 10 biggest.

 

(1) It devalues the Rugby World Cup (RWC)

The world cup has been one of rugby’s successes since it was introduced in 1987, so why would World Rugby want to introduce a new tournament that would devalue it? If we are brutally honest, it will be much harder for a team to win a fully contested Nations Championship that it would the RWC.

To win a RWC a team needs to beat about 4 tier 1 nations. We do see the odd tier 2 victory over a tier 1 nation but they are very infrequent. To win the Nations Championship a team will have to beat the top 11 teams in the world – often playing away; it’s a huge challenge.

The disparity between the two tournaments will only grow if World Rugby expands the RWC to 24 teams. This will just dilute the quality of the tournament even further.

 

(2) The lack of support from French and English clubs

It seems as if World Rugby have got this far in the planning stage without formally engaging with the major clubs in France and England. A recent tersely worded joint statement from the French (LNR) and English (PRL) professional clubs, included a not-particularly -subtle threat of further action, “reserve the option to take any action to preserve their rights and competitions”.

The French and English clubs don’t want a longer test window in November and with the private equity firm CVC buying in to Premiership rugby, there will be a push for fewer international duties, rather than more.

 

(3) Promotion and relegation and the impact on the 6N/Rugby Championship

WR’s current proposal sees the 12 teams split in to two conferences – a northern conference (6 Nations teams) and a southern conference (Rugby Championship teams plus two more based on rankings). At the end of the calendar year the bottom team in each conference will play the top team in the division below in a play-off game.

For example, assuming Italy finish bottom of the northern conference at the end of the year, they will then play-off against the top team in the division below, say Georgia, for a place in the top division.

This raises one fundamental issue and a few logistical ones.

If Georgia beats Italy then Georgia will be in the top division, it naturally follows that Georgia should then replace Italy in the 6 Nations. The 6 Nations organisers have fought against the concept of relegation for some time, but that would have to be introduced for relegation and promotion to work in the Nations Championship.

Will the 6 Nations agree to this fundamental change?

Logistically, it means the play-off game will be around the start of December. With the first game of the 6 Nations only 10 weeks away is it possible to arrange and market these games in such a short timescale? Normally packages and tickets for 6 Nations games are sold months in advance, but this won’t be possible under the proposed tournament structure, given the nature of promotion and relegation.

 

(4) Will this mean more or fewer test matches?

The original concept had teams playing a semi-final and then a final, giving us a potential test season of 13 games, although most would play just 11 games. In the latest WR release, the semi-final has been scrapped so the maximum a team could play is 12 games, with a number only playing 11.

Wales have traditionally played an “extra” test outside the normal test window and in recent times other teams have picked up the baton – Scotland, England and Ireland all played 4 tests in the 2018 November test “window”.

Under the proposed tournament rules these teams would only play a guaranteed 3 games, so losing a chunk of matchday income. A 4th test would be hard to arrange given the possibility of playing the tournament final, or even a play-off decider.

So will test teams play fewer games? Can unions such as the WRU live without this extra game, or will the additional income from the Nations Championship mean the “4th” test becomes superfluous?

New Zealand are already pitching for an extra Bledisloe Cup game, so the omens point to teams making additional arrangements outside the official tournament windows.

 

(5) Player welfare

The International Players union came out with some strong words a couple of weeks ago, pouring more scorn on World Rugby’s proposals.

Part of their concern relates to the amount of rugby they will be asked to play, but there is also the issue of travel and the physical drain that puts on bodies.

Traditionally the northern hemisphere teams would play 3 tests in 1 nation in the June/July test window, as we saw with England travelling to South Africa last year, Ireland to Australia and France to New Zealand.

In the proposed tournament these 3 games will be against 3 different nations, spread across the globe. Wales could end up playing Japan one week, Argentina the next and finish off with New Zealand.

These are huge distances travelled, across multiple time zones. Leaving aside the carbon emissions, it’s a big strain to put on professional athletes.

 

(6) Tier 2 southern hemisphere nations and player impacts

Let’s assume that Fiji get a slot in the expanded Rugby Championship. They will now have to play 3 tests in June/July, then fulfil their Rugby Championship commitments in August/September, before playing in 3 or 4 tests in November/early December.

This is potentially a good thing for Fijian rugby, but who will play for them in these games? The majority of Fiji’s best players currently play in the northern hemisphere (Nakarawa, Mata, Tuisova, Goneva, Radradra), so how will their club owners feel when they are told their star Fijians will be needed for test duty for most of the summer and 4 tests in the autumn?

Will they put pressure on the Fijians to not take up a place in the test team? Will there be an option for the players to move to the southern hemisphere, where the calendars are better aligned with the Rugby Championship, and still receive a salary roughly commensurate with their earnings in the north?

 

(7) Tier 2 exposure to tier 1 teams

World Rugby are selling this as a boost for tier 2 teams as it guarantees them a route to the top table. There is some truth in this statement but there are a few caveats.

Because of the conference set up, the only way Georgia could now play a tier 1 team is through being promoted to tier 1 (ignoring the one-off play-off game for a moment).  This certainly gives them the incentive to move up a division but in the mean time they will be cut-off from playing tier 1 nations, other than in RWC games

In recent years they have played Ireland and Wales, but this will end until Georgia reach the top table.

In the southern conference, those two tier 2 nations that make it to the top table will of course see a greater number of fixtures against tier 1 but those in the division below will be cut off until they achieve promotion.

This isn’t such a big change because Rugby Championship teams generally don’t play tier 2 nations, unless they have to!

 

(8) An uncompetitive Rugby Championship

There is a hard balancing act in rugby, between expanding our competitions to new teams and nations, while also ensuring that these competitions retain their integrity. A big concern for the Rugby Championship is that the addition of two tier 2 teams – Japan and Fiji for example, will result in the Rugby Championship losing its competitive nature and with it, supporters’ interest.

If Fiji find they can’t pick their best players, or find they don’t have the ability to adequately prepare for the Rugby Championship, then we could see some very one-sided results, which will damage the competition and potentially rugby in these tier 2 nations.

The likes of Fiji and Japan need to be allowed to compete on a level playing field when it comes to player selection, access to resources and time to prepare.

 

(9) The end of free to air (FTA) in the UK

The 6 Nations elevates rugby from a minority sport to one that captures headlines and forms debates across the UK. Arguably the main reason for this is that the games are currently all available on FTA TV, whether this be the BBC, ITV or S4C.

World Rugby has quoted some eye-watering broadcast revenues from the new proposed tournament – revenues which won’t be achieved without a move from FTA to a subscription channel.

There is undoubtedly more cash available by selling the rights to a subscription service, but the danger is by doing so it damages what makes the 6 Nations such a special tournament and consigns it to one for the true rugby enthusiasts.

As a rugby supporter in the UK we already have rugby spread across several subscription channels – Sky, BT, Premier Sports and a number of FTA channels – BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5, S4C. The last thing we need is for the 6 Nations to move to another subscription service.

(10) Sponsorship and marketing

A major challenge WR will have to face is how to market was is in effect 2 separate existing competitions, while also trying to establish a new competition.

The 6 Nations struggled to find a sponsor for their flagship tournament with Guiness eventually taking over the role, with a commercial deal worth a great deal less than 6 Nations’ chiefs had expected.

The 6 Nations main “partners” are Guiness, AWS (Amazon) and Tissot. Will these sponsors also sponsor the global Nations Championship competition or will the sponsors of the Rugby Championship have a role to play.

How will the Nations Championship branding and sponsors sit alongside the 6 Nations tournament for example?

How will the current partners of the RWC feel about this tournament coming in to existence?

 

 

Will this go ahead?

There are plenty of challenges for the tournament to even get off the ground. World Rugby have released some details around the commercial aspects of the tournament – link here, but without details it is quite hard to decipher who will financially benefit from this arrangement.

The key to determining if this will go ahead is the view and support of the clubs in England and France. Without the support of PRL and LNR the tournament will fail to get off the ground.

This proposal is all about spreading northern hemisphere TV cash to the southern hemisphere nations, so without the support of the clubs and unions in France and England it will not proceed.

These two nations will ensure that they are not financially disadvantaged by the new revenue disbursements, but the key question is will they be allocated enough of the pie to make it worth their while.

If they are, then the tournament may proceed but in our view this isn’t a good step forward for rugby.

 

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Wales v Ireland Preview: The Maul. Ireland’s Attacking Weapon Against Wales’ Defence

One of the key areas of the game on Saturday will be the maul and how each side copes with the other’s strengths.

For Ireland, the driving maul has been a potent weapon for a number of years with the national team building off the success of Munster and Leinster in perfectly such a crucial area of the game.

By contrast, Wales has never established the maul as a strong part of their armoury but their defence of the driving maul has improved considerably over the last 12 months, meaning there is not a weak aspect to their defensive game.

Let’s look at Ireland’s maul and how Wales have set up to tackle similar maul situations in previous games.

 

Ireland’s Maul

Rugby’s legislators tried to de-power the driving maul through a few law guidelines a couple of years ago, but as ever, rugby’s players and coaches are one step ahead of the game and illegal practices have crept back in to the game at the top level and made the attacking maul a great way to score easy points, through tries or penalties.

Ireland are a great exponent of the art and indeed their first try against France in this year’s 6 Nations came from a close range driving maul after just 2 minutes of play.

They established their field position due to an excellent kick from Jordan Larmour, that again showed up the lack of organisation in the French back field defence (we covered this in more detail in the analysis of the England v France game).

After turning down the 3 points, they kicked for the corner, were awarded another penalty and again opted for the lineout and an attempt at setting their driving maul.

As the clip below shows, Rory Best plunged over for the try.

There are a few aspects of the maul that are worth pointing out, that give us a few clues as to the strength of the maul and how to combat it.

As it typical of most professional level driving mauls, by the time the catcher is on his way down, a number of his supporting players have left the lineout and formed behind the catcher (see still below), with the two lifters moving in front of the catcher to protect him.

These tactics are illegal but widely used and ignored by officials.

This means as the catcher hits the ground there are 3 other players ready to immediately drive through the catcher to quickly start the momentum. A 4th supporting player arrives to start a 3rd row of drivers and finally the hooker (Rory Best) sweeps around to take the ball.

Here are the positions of the Irish players at the 3 phases of the lineout and drive. At the formation of the lineout, Ireland only put 6 players in, with the open-side flanker van der Flier in the scrum half position.

 

The ball is caught at the front by 4 (Henderson), with 8 (Stander) leaving the line and 6 (O’Mahony) moving in to lift with 1 (Healy). Even though 3 (Furlong) starts at the back of the lineout he passes 5 (Ryan) and takes his place in the 2nd line of forwards, with Ryan slotting in the back with Best.

The ball is passed from 4 to 7 and back to 2.

France don’t compete for the ball in the air, as is quite common at this level, instead they form a defensive shape which attempts to drive the Irish maul towards the touchline. We’ll come to this shape in a minute.

If we go back to the still above, it’s worth noting the slow speed with which the French defenders get in to position to counter drive, which is exacerbated by the fact Ireland have formed that 2nd line of driving players before Henderson has even hit the ground after the catch.

The view from behind shows us where the maul defence failed. Have a close look at the position and movement of France 1 (Poirot).

 

Let’s look a bit closer at the French defence and the positions their forwards end up in as the Irish set for the drive.

We can see that France have gone man for man and put 3 players in the front line of defence with two more (8 and 5) providing the 2nd wave of support to force that diagonal drive.

3 and 6 don’t join the drive but try to firefight as the Irish come through. The hooker 2 (Guirado) defends the near side.

In this defensive system, the weight comes through at an angle towards the touchline. What this means is that the key person in initially holding the drive is the player at the front – 1 (Poirot). It’s his job to hold that initial drive until the power comes through from his team mates to take the maul towards the touchline.

If we look back at the clip above we can see what happens to 1; he is immediately driven sideways away from the touchline by his opposite number Healy, so removing the key stone of the French maul defence. The two players actually end up on the floor on the opposite side of the maul to where they started.

Look at the angle of Healy’s body (1) as he works hard to drive Poirot out of that crucial position.

Once Poirot is shifted, then Guirado is fighting a losing battle on his own against the 2nd wave of players, leaving Best one on one with the French scrum half.

 

In the 20th minute of the game, Ireland again turned down a penalty kick for goal and opted for the 5 metre lineout. Interestingly, they used exactly the same lineout formation as they did for the try after 2 minutes, with 6 players and van der Flier in the scrum half position.

This time they threw to the back and not the front of the lineout, winning a penalty in the process. Again, the easy 3 points were turned down and the 5m lineout option taken, which was over-thrown by Best.

Against Wales will we see this same approach or will the objective be to build the score board through penalties? If Sexton had taken the 3 points, Ireland would have had 10 points in the first 24 minutes, all of which had come from driving mauls.

 

Wales Maul Defence

What used to be an area of weakness is now an area of strength for Wales.

In the first example we will highlight the way England were kept out from an attacking lineout, just before half time in this year’s 6 Nations.

Wales actually compete for this lineout through 4 (Cory Hill) and stop the initial English drive well. As the drive comes on and the momentum starts, Ken Owens, Josh Navidi and Ross Moriarty add their weight, which splits the maul and allows Alun-Wyn Jones to get to the ball carrier.

It was the Welsh captain’s movement and targeting of the ball that ultimately stopped the maul. Watch how he moves down the side of the maul (illegally, but permitted by Peyper) and is allowed to get to the ball carrier.

The other good piece of work here from Jones is that as soon as the catcher is coming down he starts to drive against England 7 (Curry) to stop him getting in front of the catcher and protecting him.

Contrast this with the French defence above, where both players supporting the catcher were allowed to move across and protect the catcher.

In our 2nd example, we find Wales successfully defending another crucial lineout as they lead France with just 2 minutes left to play.

Once again, we see Wales are happy to put up a competing jumper to try and steal or disrupt the ball, which in this example was successful. Instead of allowing France to catch the ball and Wales just concentrate on setting up the maul defence, they are confident in their maul defence to the point that they feel they can also compete in the air and effectively defend a maul.

Wales had a few crucial lineouts to defend against Scotland. In the first clip, we see Scotland take a clean catch and get in to position to drive.

We saw Ireland’s players leave the lineout after the throw to form up a 2nd wave of driving players, but Scotland take it a step further by having 4 players leave the lineout and form up to drive before the ball has even been thrown!

The still below shows that Scotland’s forwards haven’t got in to good positions, with 2 of them facing the wrong way (see left hand side of the maul). The key player to watch is Wales’ Adam Beard with the scrum cap, who is working his way through the middle of the maul.

As Beard works his way towards the ball the maul fragments and Wales can pick off the carrier.

The final example shows both Wales’ ability to slow the driving maul and also their ability to then disrupt the carrier.

This time there is half an effort to compete for the catch, but we don’t see the out-to-in defence this France used, where the defence drove across the field towards the touchline.

Wales main threat was again Adam Beard who worked his way down the side of the maul and attacked the ball carrier. Does he break his bind and reattach illegally?

 

The Battle of the Mauls

Who will win the battle of the mauls; Ireland’s attack or Wales’ defence?

A major factor in answering this question will be the discipline that each side keeps and the number of penalties they concede. The majority of attacking maul positions come from kicks to the corner from penalties. Stop giving away penalties and the threat becomes much diminished.

The referee will again be crucial in deciding what he will, and won’t allow. at the maul. Most of the tactics we have highlighted above are illegal, so which ones will he allow on Saturday?

Time will tell, but the lineout and driving maul could well be a big factor in deciding the outcome of the game.

 

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