Promotion and relegation has been confirmed for the Greene King IPA Championship and the men’s and women’s community game. This has been based on the best playing record formula.
Newcastle Falcons have been promoted to the Premiership, with Yorkshire Carnegie being relegated to National League One.
After initial reports suggested Ealing Trailfinders – who were in 2nd place in the Championship, would contest the decision, they have now issued a response congratulating Newcastle on the title.
The elite women’s division (Tyrrells Premier 15s) has been declared null and void as there is no promotion or relegation in this league.
Saracen’s relegation seemed to have been confirmed earlier in the season, following the salary cap breaches and with Newcastle being promoted a straight swap seems likely.
The Gallagher Premiership has not yet officially ended.
Ireland’s domestic season has concluded, with no promotion in the top men’s leagues.
Pro14
The league has been suspended indefinitely and the final has been cancelled. Pro14 say the resumption of the season will only take place when four criteria points have been met.
France
The Top 14 and ProD2 have been suspended until mid-April, when their status will be reviwed.
Lower lever French rugby has been suspended.
Test Rugby
4 men’s 6 Nations games were postponed. No date has been set for the rearranged fixtures but October has been mentioned as a possible date for the games. This will be before the official November test window opens.
We also saw 6 women’s and 3 u20 6 Nations fixtures were also cancelled, with no dates set for the rearranged fixtures.
The test matches scheduled for the June/July test window have not been cancelled or postponed, but reports suggest this could happen sooner, rather than later.
It has been suggested that instead of hosting the northern hemisphere teams, the summer test window will be cancelled, with Super Rugby filling the gap in the schedule.
The u20 World Cup was due to be held in northern Italy in June and July, but has been cancelled.
The knockout stages of the Champions and Challenge Cups, including the finals due to take place in May, have been postponed.
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Financial Impacts
USA Rugby – has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Here.
WRU – expect to make a “substantial loss” this season. Here. There will be pay cuts across the pro game from 10-25%
RFU – will lose £50m over the next 18 months, mainly due to coronovirus; staff members will take pay cuts. Here. Many Premiership clubs have applied 25% pay cuts.
SRU – pay cuts (“deferrals”) of 25-30% for senior staff and coaches
IRFU – pay cuts (“deferrals”) from 10-50% will apply to IRFU employees.
Rugby Australia – forecasting losses of £60m; 75% of staff has been stood down for 3 months; senior staff have taken 50% pay cuts. Here.
New Zealand Rugby – are in a “fight for survival”, with predicted losses of £48m; 20% wage cuts for 3 months; no staff bonuses; have bailed out their Super Rugby teams. Here.
The Schmidt era may have come to an end, but this victory was straight out of the Schmidt playbook.
We’ve talked a lot about how Ireland’s winning formula is based on the ‘pressure game’, which means applying pressure to the opposition through kicking, the breakdown, driving mauls and close carrying, until they break. This was a classic example of those tactics.
Ireland thrive on field positions in the opposition 22 and there is no better team at converting these opportunities in to points. The best way to negate these tactics, is to not give them the field position in the first place, which is exactly what Wales failed to do, due to a number of individual errors.
1st try: Jordan Larmour
The origins of this try came from a defensive error in midfield from George North. which allowed Sexton to get on the outside of him and create a 3 on 1 overlap.
We wrote last week about North’s defensive vulnerabilities in reading the game in the 13 channel, and this is exactly where he found himself, as he misread the Irish movement and came in for the ball, allowing Sexton to slip around the back of him.
This took Ireland deep in to Wales territory, but Wales stole the ball back, only to be penalised for holding on in contact. From the 5m lineout, Wales did some great work in defending the attacking maul, and from the ensuing scrum Dan Biggar’s clearing kick only found the line 10m out from the Wales try line.
Wales’ 1st mistake allowed Ireland the deep field position, while 2 more individuals errors meant Wales failed to clear their lines. Ireland’s carrying game kicked in to action while Nick Tompkins’ defensive error in over-committing to the wide channel allowed Larmour space on the inside.
2nd try: Tadhg Furlong try
Tomos Williams was a standout player in Cardiff last week. In Dublin though, he looked way off form, with weak tackles, some sloppy passing and this calamitous dropped pass, that gave Ireland the scrum, from which Furlong bundled over from the trademark Irish 3 man pre-bound carries.
3rd try: Josh van der Flier
Wales were still in the game with 44 minutes on the clock, and with an opportunity to clear the ball, they were still well positioned in the game.
Instead, Ireland stole the ball at the lineout and set up their forward pods again. From the resulting penalty, they easily drove through the Welsh maul defence for a simple try.
4th try: Andrew Conway
The game is lost for Wales. Gareth Davies tries a blind side run from deep his his 22 and a combination of a poor pass and some questionable handling, means the ball is dropped and Ireland are awarded a scrum.
You’ve probably guess the pattern by now. Ireland’s forward pods make the hard hards before opening up space for Conway on the wing. Clinical, accurate rugby.
In all 4 scenarios, Wales had the opportunity to clear the ball and force Ireland to play from deep, where they are far less potent.
These basic errors littered Wales’ play through the match.
Wales’ basic errors
Coming out after half time, Wales would have felt they were in the game, and if the errors could be cut out, their attacking play would give them the advantage.
Instead, it took just a minute for the first individual error, as the usually dependable Dan Biggar fumbled a pass from a long Conor Murray clearing kick.
Biggar recovers well, but after one phase, Tomos Williams throws a horrible pass, which Nick Tompkins fails to gather and Ireland are awarded a scrum.
This final example sums up Wales’ performance, but also nicely links us to the influence Pivac is having on the team.
Ireland move the ball wide and kick long. Parkes covers the kick but instead of taking the tackle, securing the ball and then attempting to clear long down the field, he tries a very high risk pass out of the tackle.
The pass is deemed forward, and once again Wales gift Ireland an attacking field position exactly where they want to be to launch their forwards.
Pivac’s Wales
We need to remember that Wales were chasing the game when Parkes made this decision, but it’s a nice example of how Pivac wants to play the game and the risks that come with his approach.
Anyone who watched the Scarlets under Pivac, will know that his style is at the opposite end of the spectrum to his predecessor Warren Gatland. Where Gatland liked structure and predictability, Pivac’s team have been happy to take risks and seek an unstructured game.
Against Italy, we saw all the risk taking come off. Against Ireland, the offloads and forced passes were often going to ground, or in some cases Irish players.
There is nothing wrong with offloading out of contact at the right time, as we saw for Tomos Williams’ try in the first half. The challenge is instilling an off-loading mindset in to a group of players, while ensuring that the decision to offload is made at the right time and the right place.
There may be times when it is better to take contact; for example when the team is retreating and an offload just puts another player under pressure, or in the Parkes example when a mistake will give the opposition an attacking opportunity.
In the two 6 Nations games, we have seen Pivac’s influence on the team start to grow. Offloading is one example, having the back row running with the ball in wider channels is another. They are now employing an inside runner off the outside half, to keep the inside defence keen. Wales also seem to be playing narrower in defence. We will come to these tactics in more detail later in the tournament.
One aspect of Wales’ game that is new and did work was the “out to in” wide carries.
“Out to in” carries
Gatland’s Wales tended to push their forward carriers in straight lines, fairly close to the breakdown. In contrast, Pivac’s Wales often employed a wider pass to a forward (or sometimes a back) who was running a line from outside, to back infield.
Hadleigh Parkes hit an out to in line for his try scoring opportunity, where he just lost the ball in contact, but we also saw the tactic used in phase play further out from Ireland’s line.
Here is Parkes again with the same line.
Here is Dillon Lewis with the same line.
Wales had a lot of joy with this approach.
The benefits of the tactic is that teams usually push on to the first receiver, with those defenders further out often standing deeper and with bigger gaps between each player. Runners can then target these gaps and the more passive defence.
The other benefit is that defenders tend to look in, towards the ball and aren’t always aware of angled runs from outside their view.
It’s a good tactic and one that we will watch in the 6 Nations.
Pivac verdict
It’s far too early to judge Pivac’s tenure.
We know that Shaun Edwards is a great defence coach but even he failed to keep Italy scoreless, which was what this Welsh team achieved last week.
Wales under Gatland and Edward also suffered from Ireland’s pressure game in Dublin on a couple of occasions, indeed here’s a reminder of Wales failing to deal with Ireland pre-bound pods in Dublin 2 years ago.
We can see aspects of Wales’ offensive game starting to evolve. It was just the sheer weight of individual errors that led to Ireland’s dominance yesterday, rather than any systemic issue with Wales’ play.
The question is, are those errors due to the new style of play, Ireland’s pressure or just a bad day at the office for a number of players? We should have more answers as this tournament progresses.
As the 2020 6 Nations rumbles on, social media is awash with footage of the greatest tries the tournament has seen. Jinking outside halves, flying wingers, switch moves and no shortage of attacking play; rugby as it should be played.
One particular clip that caught the eye was Phil Bennett’s spectacular try in the 1977 Scotland v Wales fixture, as the mercurial fly half finishes off an 80 metre move under the posts.
But hang on…..looking at this try with the eye of the modern rugby viewer, we can’t help but notice a couple of those passes looked a bit marginal.
Rugby was a different beast back in the amateur days of the 1970s, with no ability for referees to view replays and no Third Match Official (TMO) sitting in a box, watching play back for offences.
So how would the greatest tries in rugby history be assessed under the modern scrutiny from the TMO? Let’s start with Bennett’s try.
Phil Bennett (Scotland v Wales 1977)
“Check, check…..it’s Ben Skeen here”…..
The TMO would probably want to look at two passes in the build up to Bennett’s try.
The first is the pass from Bennett to David Burcher. As we can see from the clip, the ball travels a long way forward from the point of release, but of course it’s the direction of hands that we use as a guide as to what constitutes forward.
Bennett’s hands look like they are pointing forward and the ball comes out of the hands in a forward direction.
Burcher then throws a one handed over-head pass that also has the hint of the forward pass about it (see below).
TMO decision: No try. Forward pass. Scrum to Scotland on half way line.
Gareth Edwards (Barbarians v New Zealand, 1973)
Often known as the greatest try of all time, we poked a bit of fun at this in an article a couple of years ago.
It’s a beautiful try that combines backs and forwards in a flowing move from one end of the pitch to the other.
If this was being refereed in a 2020 game, the move may well have been brought to a halt deep in the Barbarian’s 22, when JPR Williams is on the receiving end of a neck high tackle.
As play develops, we see some lovely interplay between forwards and backs and the ball being kept alive in contact. But what’s this…..Quinnell to Edwards….
Even without the advent of the TMO, this pass should really have been picked up by the referee.
Verdict: No try. Forward pass. No advantage for the high tackle, penalty to the Barbarians in their 22m.
Shane Williams (Wales v Scotland, 2010)
With 3 minutes remaining Scotland led Wales by 10 points. What transpired was rugby’s greatest ever come back, which was sealed by Shane Williams dotting down under the posts after a multi-phase attack from deep in the Welsh half.
Why did Stephen Jones kick the ball cross-field when he had a number of players out wide? Who knows, but the bounce of the ball falls for Wales and as Lee Byrne gathers the ball and is tackled, he throws a forward pass to Leigh Halfpenny, who has only just got up off the floor.
Verdict: No try. Forward pass. Scrum to Scotland.
Serge Blanco (France v Australia, 1987)
It was a try that showed French rugby at it’s best, as forwards and backs swept down the field, culminating in Serge Blanco going over in the corner to put France in to the final of the inaugural Rugby World Cup.
Apart from a nasty no-arms tackles from Australia, it was the pace of France’s number 4 (Alain Lorieux) to follow up Patrice Lagisquet’s kick that caught the key. How did he put pressure on Australia in midfield? It’s because he was about 2 metres in front of the kick.
Verdict: No try. Offside. Penalty to Australia.
The TMO is a mainstay of modern, professional rugby. It was brought in to highlight obvious infringements that the match officials missed, but has this made rugby a better spectacle?
Would rugby in the 1970s and 1980s have been better if the TMO had been used? Imagine a rugby history where these tries had been disallowed?
One of the themes that we have focused on over the last few seasons has been the number of games – and minutes played, by test players in the 6 Nations.
Firstly, let’s have a quick recap on the 2017/18 patterns.
2017/18 season
After the 2017 British and Irish Lions tour to New Zealand, it was noticeable how the rest periods for key Lions’ players following the tour, differed by nation.
The full article is here, but what is shows is that the Irish players involved in the test series were given about 83/84 days’ rest before their domestic return in the 2017/18 season. By contrast, the English contingent had between 55 and 71 days’ break, with the Welsh test Lions falling somewhere between the two (57 to 76).
As the 2017/18 season evolved, we witnessed Ireland win a Grand Slam, with a dominant display against a lethargic England at Twickenham.
Our analysis had already highlighted that Ireland’s key players had been given a much longer break following the Lions tour, but this article went on to look at the minutes played by the respective teams in that Twickenham game.
We found that on average, each of the Ireland players who took to the pitch on the final 6 Nations weekend against England, had played 4.5 games fewer than their English counterparts.
Did a combination of the longer recovery plus the lighter playing load during the season play a part in Ireland’s Grand Slam?
The analysis also highlighted that the two teams’ players, played roughly the same amount of test and European rugby, but there was a huge difference in the minutes played in the respective domestic leagues.
England’s players had played on average 300 minutes more domestic rugby than their Irish counterparts.
By the end of the season, we still saw a disparity in the minutes played by the two Ireland and England test teams. As this article explains in more detail, by the end of the season the players from England had played on average, 319 minutes more rugby than their Irish counterparts. This is nearly 4 full games of rugby.
If we look at the total minutes played by players from both squads across the season, it shows only 4 Irish players make it in to the top 20.
2018/19 season – 6 Nations
The pattern of longer summer rests for Ireland’s players continued.
Ireland and England both played their final summer test on the same day (23rd June 2018), and yet on the first weekend of the new 2018/19 Pro14 season, just 2 of the Ireland squad in the final summer test played some game minutes.
This contrasts with 23 of England’s squad playing on the same weekend.
At the start of the 2019 6 Nations, we took a look at the starting XV selections for the first game of the tournament and calculated how many minutes each of the starting teams had played in the season to date.
The data showed that Ireland’s players had played just 830 minutes, England’s 1038 and Wales’ 918.
The pattern is again clear; Ireland’s players play fewer games and minutes than England’s.
This time it was England who made Ireland look devoid of ideas and lacking intensity, as they secured a comfortable win in game week 1 in Dublin.
However, once again, England’s form tailed off towards the end of the tournament as they were beaten in Cardiff in game week 3, before just about managing a draw in Twickenham against a resurgent 2nd half Scotland in the final tournament game.
In our article, we asked “it will be interesting to see of England’s form can be maintained through the 6 Nations”.
The answer was that they couldn’t maintain the form. How much of this is down to England’s player management; particularly when the same group of players have to perform 4 or 5 times in 7 weeks?
Wales ultimately won the Grand Slam. They may not rest their players as much as Ireland’s but the data shows that both their minutes and games played figures are way below England’s and France’s. How much advantage does this give them?
2018/19 full season
After looking at the figures leading up to the 6 Nations, we then went on to calculate the games and minutes played across the whole season, for all test players from England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
All 4 teams played 9 test matches, with Ireland using 42 players, Scotland and Wales 41 and England 39.
All squad members
Let’s first look at the data for all players who played a test during the season – including those that played all 9 games, to those that played in just 1 fixture.
This table below shows the number of games that the squad members played in, across the season; test, domestic and European rugby.
The following table looks at the number of minutes played:
Of course, it’s worth mentioning that there are numerous explanations for each of these data points, from players having long periods out due to injuries, to certain nations having teams that go further in European competitions, to strategic decisions to rest certain players.
What do the tables tell us?
England’s test players over the season played the most minutes and the most games, compared to the other 3 nations. Wales played the fewest.
This data considers all squad members, but what would the figures look like if we split the squad by number of tests played during the season? Does the pattern hold if we only look at each nation’s leading test players?
Players with 7-9 caps in the season
By focusing on the players with 7 to 9 caps during the season, we can determine the player management approach for each team’s key players.
Here are the average minutes played in total and the breakdown for each competition.
The first thing that stands out is that the Wales, Ireland and Scotland average is very similar, even though the make up of the total average minutes figure varies; Wales’ players played fewer European minutes, while Ireland’s play relatively few games in the Pro14.
England’s average at 1809 minutes, is 326 minutes higher than Wales’ figure and 383 higher than Scotland’s. This equates to about 4 to 5 full games of rugby more per season or about 22% more rugby than Wales’ senior players.
The data also shows us that with 20 players in this category, Wales rely on a small number of players to shoulder the playing burden. This should benefit Wales through familiarity, but it does also highlight Wales’ small playing pool.
The final area we will focus on for this group is to determine which players played the most over the season,
The graph below shows the overall rankings for total minutes played over the season for each team’s key players.
The graph makes interesting reading. There are 8 England players, 6 from Wales, 5 from Scotland and one solitary Irishman.
6 of the top 7 spots are taken by English players, with Saracens taking 3 of the top 6 spots (Daly was a Wasps player in 2018/19). If the Vunipola brothers had been fit all season, they may also have appeared on this list.
Again we see Ireland’s player management approach at work, with many of their top players being carefully managed throughout the season.
Interestingly, two of the Welsh entries play for English club teams, which will have pushed up their domestic minutes through the season.
Do minutes matter?
The data has shown us that England’s players started the season earlier than their rivals, they then went on to play on average, more minutes than the other 3 teams by some distance and finally their top players play far more rugby than other nations’ key players.
At the other end of the spectrum, Ireland’s star names are carefully managed throughout the season, meaning they play fewer minutes than England’s on average and their top players play fewer minutes than their English counterparts.
Wales and Scotland sit in the middle, with a low average minutes played figure for their top players (at a similar level to Ireland’s) but some of their top players take on a reasonable playing burden.
Ultimately, it was Wales who won the 6 Nations and who looked fresh and purposeful in the critical games against Ireland and England. Had the lack of meaningful games in Europe by Wales’ regions actually helped the preparation of the national team?
How much difference these player management plans make is open to debate. It may also be the case that we will not see the impacts on player welfare until later in their careers.
England and Saracens’ key players like Farrell, George, Kruis and Itoje have had a number of years of playing a great deal of rugby. They may be well recompensed for their labour, but will this workload affect their ability to play as they get older? Or are they conditioned and have the physiology to withstand the demands of elite rugby for years on end?
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Wayne Pivac’s hand has been forced by injuries, so it wasn’t a great surprise to see him select George North at outside centre for the opening 2020 6 Nations game against Italy.
The Warren Gatland era has come to an end. One of the defining features of his tenure was the aggressive midfield blitz, with the player in the 13 position pushing hard and fast in order to cut off the ball going wide.
This forced the attacking teams to come back inside, towards the Welsh backrow defence or allowed the outside centre to take man and ball, way behind the gain line. Either way, the tactic was very effective.
One of the reasons that the approach was so successful, was that Wales used Jonathan Davies in this outside centre role.
Davies is a strong ball carrier, with a great fend but it is perhaps his defensive strength that made him one of the key figures in Gatland’s – and Shaun Edwards’ system.
Wales’ blitz at outside centre
Here’s a great example of Davies in the 13 channel in an Edwards defensive system. Watch how he pushes up, reads the movement of the England players and then commits to the tackle.
His role is crucial in that it needs fitness, a good reading of the game, anticipation, vision, communication and accuracy. If we look at the space outside Davies as the play starts we can see why the 13 position is so crucial to maintaining the defensive integrity (see below).
The still shows the amount of space he has to defend to his left, with the wing sitting deeper and wider and tracking his opposite wing. It’s a position where you feel very exposed.
Wales stuck to this tactic throughout the Gatland years but we saw how crucial Jon Davies was to its success, when he was injured and that position was taken by someone else.
In the 2017 test against New Zealand, Wales’ midfield defence – minus Jonathan Davies, was ruthlessly exposed on a number of occasions. This article covers the incidents in a bit more detail but just to pick out one example, from late in the game, we see how key Jon Davies’ presence is to Wales’ success.
As the still below shows, New Zealand attack and have plenty of options either side of the carrier. Wales 10/12 axis are fairly tight and flat but look at the positioning of 13 (Owen Williams).
We would expect Wales’ 13 to be pushing up past his inside players and cutting off that wide ball. Instead, Williams is a couple of metres behind the rest of the midfield.
As the play progresses Williams stays deep and seems to be focused on what’s going on inside him, rather than reading the play developing in his channel.
The ball ended up in Rieko Ioane’s hands and he had a clear run to the line. Owen Williams doesn’t play too much rugby at 13, but this example just shows how crucial that role is to the Welsh system.
Pivac’s approach
With Warren Gatland heading out of the door, his defensive guru Shaun Edwards followed – only because the WRU would offer a 2 – rather than 4 year contract, if recent reports are true.
Will Wales continue to adopt the same defensive system under Pivac and his specialist coach Byron Haywood?
If we look back at the Scarlets’ success under Pivac and Haywood, it was the attacking flare that gave them the edge in the big battles, rather than the solidity in defence.
This season, the Scarlets’ under coach Brad Moar, are noticeably more aggressive and have a faster line speed in their midfield defence than under the Pivac regime. Is this a conscious tactic by Haywood and Pivac?
Will we still see a rushing 13, look to move the opposition back infield, or will Pivac be happy with the ball going wide, with the belief it will stretch the game and lead to more turnovers, which will benefit Wales? Time will tell.
What we do know is that George North is playing against Italy at 13.
He has played just a hand full of test matches at 13, with his comfort zone being on the wing.
We have been a bit critical of several aspects of his game in recent years – with defence being one of them. How will he cope in the 13 channel having to read the plays in front of him and communicate with his winger and those inside him?
Back in 2014/15 he played a few games at outside centre, with Warren Gatland hinting that he may have a longer term career in that position. Ultimately he stayed on the wing for most of the last 5 years, but did Gatland see something then that convinced him North was better used on the wing? Or was he concerned about his defensive abilities.
In this clip from the 2014 6 Nations, North and Priestland inside him, seem a little unsure who is taking the carrier. By the time North moves on to Bastereaud he is still well placed to make an effective tackle, but ends up being easily brushed off.
In this next clip, we see North defending the short side and Wales are exposed by the French overlap.
As the ball comes wide North has no choice but to move towards the ball carrier (yellow line). What he isn’t fully aware of, is the movement of French players either side of the carrier, in particular one player looping around the back.
As North quickly moves towards the ball, the attacker slows down his advance, giving time for the player to loop around him and receive a clever pass.
These are the sorts of decisions that North will have to make a lot more of, playing at outside centre as opposed to the wing. He will have to contend with the attacking team having options either side of him, meaning that his reading of the game and decision making need to be spot on.
Given Wales have Italy first up, should mean that North has a relatively easy ride, but later in the tournament he could be tested by the stronger teams in his defensive duties, particularly in that 13-wing channel.
What North’s move to centre does show, is Wales’ lack of options and contingency planning in these positions. Some players have lost form, others have been injured but a number of promising talents such as the Dragons’ Tyler Morgan seem to have fallen by the way side.
With Wales’ having a plethora of options on the wing, we may find that North spends more of his future in the Welsh shirt at centre, rather than wing.
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It’s nearly that time of year again, when rugby moves from being a minority sport to one where your butcher and gran have a strong view on who should be starting the opening fixture – it’s 6 Nations time!
One aspect of the Wales squad announcement that is always interesting to monitor is the relative contribution of players from each of the regions and from “overseas” teams. It gives us a view of the changing strengths of each region and the competing pull from the English and French teams.
We now know the 38 players chosen in Wayne Pivac’s first 6 Nations squad, so this is what the data shows us.
Contribution for each year by region
This year’s contribution is: Scarlets – 10, England – 10, Cardiff Blues – 7, Dragons – 5, Ospreys – 5 and France – 1.
The left hand Y axis shows the number of players in the initial 6 Nations squad.
If we now express this same data as a percentage of the total squad size, as opposed to an absolute number of players, we get the following graph:
What do the graphs show us? Well, there are a few obvious things to pick out:
The squad size has varied greatly over the past 15 seasons, from around 28/29 in the early Gatland years to 39 over the last year or two; it would have been 40 in 2019 but for Taulupe Faletau’s late withdrawal because of a broken arm
After a steady stream of players heading to France, we now have just the single French representative
The number of players being based in England has been growing and with 10 in the 2020 squad, this is the highest contribution in the period
The Dragons have consistently contributed the fewest players of all the Welsh regions over the period but this year’s contribution of 5 is their joint highest ever
With a contribution of 5, this is the lowest Ospreys number of Ospreys players in a squad, and the first time they have been the smallest contributor (joint with the Dragons)
The Ospreys have supplied more players for each squad than any other region over the period
The Scarlets are the highest contributor for the third season in a row
Looking at some of these findings in a bit more detail:
Squad size
Over the period we have analysed the squad size has varied from 39 to just 28, although the trend seems to be for bigger squads.
This year’s squad (38) is slightly smaller than the last two chosen by Warren Gatland but with the likes of Saracens’ Rhys Carre missing the first game through suspension and a number of players having limited recent game time, the large squad gives them more flexibility.
Contributions from England and France
As the first graph showed, the general trend over the analysis period is for more players from outside Wales to be picked in the Wales 6 Nations squad. If we break this number down in to its two categories – England and France, we get the following distribution:
The contribution from England this season is a new high in recent times. Not only are we seeing players from Welsh regions move to England (Rhys Carre this season as an example), we are also seeing players that have never been in the professional Welsh system, get called in to the Welsh squad.
Saracens’ Nick Tompkins has been called up for this tournament, despite having played for England at u20 level, while Wasps Will Rowland has played all his professional rugby in the English game but has a Welsh dad.
The inclusion of 18 year old Louis Rees-Zammit also points to a new category of player that may become increasingly common in the future; Welsh players who go to English colleges and academies at a young age, and who start their senior professional careers in the English Premiership.
The French exodus peaked in 2014 and 2015 and has been in a steady decline ever since. Rhys Webb is the sole French representative, after being given dispensation by the WRU to play in the tournament, following the announcement of his move back to the Ospreys from Toulon.
Will we see another player capped out of a French team in the foreseeable future?
Contribution by Welsh region
Which Welsh regions have contributed the most players over the period? The Scarlets jumped above Cardiff for 2nd place in the table during the 2018 6 Nations, but both are still a considerable distance behind the Ospreys.
If we average this out for each season:
And finally, which team has been the top contributing region for any one 6 Nations’ season?
Although the Scarlets are the top contributor in 2020 with 10 players, for the first time a Welsh region shares the top spot with another country – England.
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Here is the 3rd annual analysis of Twitter followers of clubs in rugby’s 4 main professional leagues.
Does this give us a unique insight in to the varying fortunes of each league, can we use it as a proxy for the commercial clout of the respective teams……or is it just a load of pointless tables that are only of interest to people who like geeky rugby tables?
Probably the latter, but here you go……
Twitter followers for the major professional leagues as at 6th January 2020.
Pro14
(1) Total number of followers.
There are no real changes to the Pro14 table.
The two Italian teams continue to battle each other towards the foot of the table, while Connacht – who passed Cardiff Blues in 2019, extend their lead over the Welsh region.
(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020
(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase
Gallagher Premiership
(1) Total number of followers
There are no changes in the top 4 places in the table, compared to 2019.
Wasps have slipped one place from 5th to 6th, while Exeter have moved down one place from 6th to 7th. Saracens have jumped from 7th to 5th.
(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020
(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase
Top 14
(1) Total number of followers
(2) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020
Brive and Bayonne are not included in this table.
(3) Number of new followers gained between January 2019 and January 2020, as a % increase
Brive and Bayonne are not included in this table
Super Rugby
(1) Total number of followers
Comparing 2019 to 2020, there have been very few changes but the big story is the Sunwolves, off the back of the Rugby World Cup, leaping from 15th place to 12th.
The Jaguares are also starting to put pressure on the Bulls for the 3rd spot.
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Consolidated – Total Followers
Including a comparison with 2019 and the number of places moved, where applicable.
Wales’ defeat in the final minutes of their semi-final against South Africa, means Warren Gatland’s march towards World Cup glory has come to an end. With just the unenviable task of raising his troops for the third place play-off against his home nation New Zealand to come, we look back at his tenure as coach of Wales.
Let’s rewind to September 2007 and with just 3 minutes remaining on the match clock, Fiji’s Graham Dewes flops over the try line, to give Fiji victory over Wales and in doing so, they knocked Wales out of the Rugby World Cup.
This was a nadir for Welsh rugby. The team that took to the field that day was not short of talent, but the lack of game strategy, cohesion, defensive prowess and collectiveness meant an early exit from the world cup in ignominy.
The dragon was on his knees, weeping.
The shame continued for coach Gareth Jenkins as he was sacked following the game, reportedly in a car park.
Although that moment was a dark one for Welsh rugby – and there have been plenty of those in the 1990s and 2000s, we can now look back on it as the moment of Welsh rugby’s renaissance as a true global power.
Within a couple of months of that defeat in Nantes, the WRU announced the appointment of Waikato coach Warren Gatland as their new coach, in a move that was to eventually restore Wales’ credibility, respect and ability on the field, to compete with the top rugby nations.
Wales’ slow demise
The 2007 World Cup campaign under coach Gareth Jenkins, was a catastrophic failure for the Welsh team, which was packed full of talented players such as Shane Williams, Tom Shanklin, Stephen Jones, Dwayne Peel, Martyn Williams, Colin Charvis, Adam Jones, Gethin Jenkins and a young Alun-Wyn Jones.
The warning bells had sounded earlier though, with an abject 2007 6 Nations tournament that saw Wales pick up a single victory – against England, and included a defeat away at Italy.
The 2006 6 Nations was another tournament of upheaval for Wales, as Mike Ruddock – the coach of the 2005 Grand Slam winning team, resigned just 2 games in to the competition, in mysterious circumstances.
Wales had spent a few years lurching from one disaster to another, but it was to be the appointment of Warren Gatland and his defence coach Shaun Edwards, that proved to be the catalyst for change.
The Gatland and Edwards way
Gatland had previously had a great deal of success coaching in the northern hemisphere with Connacht, Ireland and Wasps, before returning to New Zealand, where he was identified as the WRU’s number one target.
So much of Gatland’s coaching career has been intertwined with ex-rugby league star, Shaun Edwards that it is probably fair to treat them as a double act; where they should both equally share in the plaudits around Wales’ resurgence.
Gatland chose Edwards to be his defence coach and he surrounded himself with the team he thought could do the job, which has changed little over the past 12 years.
With Gatland’s first game being in the 2008 6 Nations, at Twickenham, where Wales hadn’t won for 20 years, the omens for a positive start weren’t good. But in a sign of his faith in his own decision making (also think of him dropping Brian O’Driscoll for the Lions in 2013), he selected 13 players from one team (the Ospreys) to start the game.
Wales started the game poorly, and were 16-6 down at half time, before a resurgent Wales stormed back in the 2nd half to seal a rare victory at Twickenham, which set them off on their Grand Slam season.
In the space of just 8 months, Wales had plunged the depths with defeat to Fiji, before elevating themselves to champions of the 6 Nations, with essentially the same group of players.
Since then Gatland has led Wales to 2 more Grand Slams, a 6 Nations Championship, two World Cup semi-finals and a World Cup quarter final defeat.
Gatland’s Wales
So what has Gatland actually done for Wales?
There are probably 5 key areas where Gatland has had his influence on the Welsh team.
The first area is around defence, and here credit must also go to Shaun Edwards; Wales are a miserly team when it comes to allowing the opposition to score tries. In the 2008 6 Nations tournament, Wales conceded just 2 tries! In this year’s 6 Nations they conceded just 7 (3 fewer than the next best placed team).
The second area is fitness. It is no coincidence that Wales’ defence keeps its integrity right up to the 80 minute mark – as it needed to do in the World Cup game against Australia. The players are much fitter than they were in the pre-Gatland days and this has helped give Wales’ defence the solidity it needs to reduce the oppositions’ point scoring opportunities.
The third area is mental toughness. This is often a function or form, fitness and confidence but it is something that Wales has developed over recent years and it unquestionably helped them to beat France and Australia in the recent World Cup games.
Even on bad days, when you know how to win and importantly you expect to win, the wins often follow. As Wales were being pummeled by Australia in the 2nd half of their pool game, you could see the Wales players were confident enough to trust their defence, knowing they could withstand the pressure and then work their way back in to the game.
The 4th area is around Wales’ gameplan. Gatland’s teams are not always the most creative outfits, nor are they the teams that take the highest number of risks or often get supporters off their seats with a surprise play, but nobody can fault Wales for not having a clear way of playing their game, which the players know and fit in to.
In the early days, Wales played slow forward carries to the narrow side ad infinitum, it was tedious to watch, but the objective (to create space on the opposite wing) was clear. Similarly, Wales tactic of keeping clearing kicks in play is one we have always disagreed with, but the game plan is clear and Wales believe it works.
The final area is about Wales hard edge. The “Welsh way” of playing rugby was traditionally all about swift hands, wingers running in space and outside halves jinking through the opposition’s defence. The onus was very much on a game played through the number 10, with creative rugby being the name of the game.
Gatland has toned down this side of Wales’ game and instead – through fitness, player selection and tactics, has given the whole Wales team a hard, physical approach that means the big names in world rugby can no longer bully Wales through a direct game plan.
There are also valid criticisms of Wales’ style and performances under Gatland, whether this be the relatively poor record against southern hemisphere teams, the inability to develop a creative edge or the lack of improvement in basic elements of forward play such as the lineout and attacking maul.
When we think of the good and the not-so-good aspects of Gatland’s Wales, there are two phases of play that immediately spring to mind, that illustrate clearly what Gatland’s Wales looks like.
Wales v Australia (2015 Rugby World Cup)
Australia won this crucial pool game, 15-6, but the story of the match was Wales’ inability to break down the Australian defence during the 2nd half. A victory for Wales would have meant a quarter final against Scotland, rather than the trickier tie they ended up with against the Springboks.
Wales played 7 minutes of the 2nd half against just 13 Aussies (due to 2 yellow cards)…..and yet they couldn’t find a way to unlock the defence.
Wales tried close carries through their forwards, they tried driving mauls from 5m lineouts, they went wide, they went narrow…..but they still couldn’t breach the try line.
Gatland’s Wales will not be remembered as a creative team, and these passages of play clearly shown their inability to get over the try line against the best rugby nations.
This defeat was their 11th in a row against Australia. Gatland’s Wales have won 3 of 16 games against the Wallabies, which is a record that doesn’t stack up well when we compare it to Ireland and England’s.
In a period where Wales have been at the level of Ireland and England in the 6 Nations, their inferior record against all the southern hemisphere teams, is a blot on his record.
Wales v Ireland (2015 6 Nations)
This game was chosen as an example of how good Wales’ defence has been under Gatland and Edwards, which is typified by the 32 phases of defence in the 2nd half.
These phases of play highlight many of the traits that Gatland has developed with his Wales’ teams over the last 12 years.
It’s clear to see the strength of the defensive organisation, the players’ trust in the systems, their fitness to keep getting up and getting back in the line and their mental fortitude to keep defending that try line.
Wales’ blitz defence, with Jon Davies in the 13 channel pushing to close off the outside ball is another characteristic of Wales under Gatland and Edwards, and it was also prominent in this clip.
We see the likes of Sam Warburton’s strength, both in the tackle and over the ball, coupled with the leadership of Alun-Wyn Jones as he marshalls the defensive troops.
This passage of play typifies everything that Gatland has done for Wales under his watch.
Wales’ greatest coach
It is always difficult to compare across eras but it is far to say that Warren Gatland is Wales’ greatest ever coach, due to the success he has brought to the team and the longevity of his tenure.
During his time with Wales, he has been on the receiving end of criticism from a number of quarters. Some of the tactical elements he has brought to the team, we have questioned, such as keeping clearing kicks in play.
Should he have been allowed time off from his Wales job to coach the Lions, given the disruption this caused the national team?
Why hasn’t he freshened his coaching team up at appropriate times in the rugby cycle to allow some new ideas to be brought to the squad, which may have lifted Wales’ levels during the dips in form.
Has he sacrificed an element of creativity, risk and footballing skill in the team in order to ensure that first and foremost, Wales could defend and stop the opposition scoring? Often Wales have looked more comfortable without the ball than with the ball under Gatland, as we saw in the dour semi-final against South Africa.
Has he been tactically flexible at crucial times, to move away from the standard gameplan and look for different solutions to fix on-field problems; the box kicking duel against the Springboks comes to mind.
Why is Wales’ record against the southern hemisphere teams not as good as Ireland’s and England’s over the same period?
These are all valid questions, to which we can only guess the answers and how those changes would have affected Wales’ results over the past 12 years.
What we do know for certain though, is that Gatland has taken Wales from a laughing stock of world rugby in 2007, to one that stood at the top of World Rugby’s rankings in 2019.
In the intervening years, he has won 3 Grand Slams, a 6 Nations Championship and restored Wales to the top table of World Rugby.
His methods have turned a nation of talented players in to one that is able to physically match the best in the world and compete against nations with far greater playing and financial resources.
He should also receive credit for doing this during a period when the Welsh regional game has been going through turmoil, with players not knowing whether they have a job next season and the continuing gradual decline in the strength of the regional teams.
To put together a team to win the 2019 Grand Slam and to get to the semi-finals of the World Cup, against the background of more civil war in the Welsh game, shouldn’t be underestimated.
Wayne Pivac will now take over Gatland’s team and in the coming seasons we will see Gatland’s achievements in some context. Will Pivac’s Wales build on the success Gatland has developed? Time will tell.
We now get ready to say goodbye to Wales’ greatest coach; one that has brought pride back to the jersey and delivered the nation many great rugby moments over his tenure.
The Dragon roars once again.
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Usually, when a team has secured its place in a World Cup semi-final, it’s easy to go through the quarter final game and pick out lots of positive pieces of play to put in a nice article.
In the case of Wales’ performance against France, there are very few moments of offensive play that are worth highlighting, with the majority of Wales’ pressure coming late in the game as Wales scrambled against a 14 man French team, to finally overtake them on the scoreboard.
Everything Wales did looked laboured and difficult. Their kicking game was awry, they lost ball in contact, Biggar had very few options around him as a play maker, the defence lacked its usual intensity….we could go on.
It’s worth starting by praising France’s play, in what was probably their best performance since the 2011 World Cup. We have often been critical of France over the last few years, and rightly so, as a country with the economic and playering resources of France should be competing for the 6 Nations every year, rather than continually languishing in the bottom half of the table.
Their organisation and fitness looked improved, their tactical kicking was much better and they seemed to put together several cohesive plays that harked back to the olde days of French rugby.
Perhaps the extra week off France had after the cancellation of the Wales game gave them a conditioning advantage, or at least more time to switch off and prepare for the Wales fixture. We will never know, but looking at the play on the pitch, it was obvious that France had a verve and intensity to their game that Wales lacked.
This is a good Wales team
In fact it’s a very good Wales team. To go through autumn 2018 unbeaten and then to secure the Grand Slam, shows how strong this team is. That’s not up for debate.
The question now is do Wales have that creative spark that will enable them to go from a very good team, to a point where they can beat South Africa in a World Cup semi-final and really challenge for the championship? Does a team need to be creative to win a World Cup?
The strength of this team is their defensive organisation and commitment and their mental tenacity to keep going when games look lost. But will that be enough to go that last step to get to the very top of the tree?
Wales in 2019
Leaving aside the World Cup warm up games, this has been a great season for Wales, with the grand slam win, followed by two victories at the World Cup over Australia and France.
Let’s focus on Wales’ tries this calendar year.
In the 6 Nations, Wales only scored 10 tries (the same number as Italy) and well behind England, who ran in 24. The key to their victories can be seen in the “tries against” column, which shows a miserly 7 (compared to England’s 13 and Ireland’s 10).
Fast forward to the World Cup and Wales managed 2 tries against France and a pair against Australia.
So Wales don’t score many, but their strength in defence means that they can pick up victories against strong tier 1 nations.
If we look in a bit more detail at Wales’ tries, it highlights another aspect of their game.
To crudely categorise the nature of a try, we can classify them as “created” – meaning the try came about by the creative play from the team, or “pressure try”, one which arises from pressure exerted on the opposition.
The pressure game is one that Ireland have excelled in, with Murray and Sexton’s kicking game and breakdown pressure, often yielding points. The key point is that teams don’t necessarily have to have complex set piece moves or have individuals that can make one on one breaks; there are more ways to score points than through “creating” a try.
In the 14 tries against tier 1 this 6 Nations and World Cup, 5 of these tries have come from “pressure” plays, including both tries against France (Wainwright profited from Wales’ aggressive line speed and France spilling the ball, and Moriarty’s try which came from the 7 man France scrum going backwards).
In the Australia game, Gareth Davies’ interception try also came from good Welsh pressure, while Wales secured two “pressure” tries in France at the start of the year.
To complete the full picture, 4 of the tries came from kicks near the opposition line, whether these were cross field (Parkes v Australia, Adams v England) or chip kicks (Parkes v Ireland, Watkin v Italy). The other 5 tries came from phase play (1 each against Italy, France and England and 2 against Scotland).
So what does this tell us:
Wales don’t score many tries
Wales don’t concede many tries, which allows them to compete against the top teams
A large % of their tries come from applying pressure (particularly against the better tier 1 teams)
It is probably a fair statement to make that Wales don’t create many opportunities, but why is this?
The creativity gap
The way Wales are set up, is dictated by the players Gatland has available to him and the tactics he adopts.
Taking the player availability issue firstly, as an example, Wales don’t really have a big ball carrying number 8 available to them, like a Billy Vunipola for England or Isi Naisarani for Australia, nor do they have a carrying tight head prop (think Furlong or Sinckler) – although Dillon Lewis may develop in to one.
Having ball carrying forwards is a huge advantage at test level, so Gatland is limited in one means of creating space for his backs. This means his strategy has to evolves to try and counter another team’s carriers by putting an emphasis on strong tacklers and a number of tackling options.
Even looking at this single example, we can see how Wales are forced to sacrifice “creative” options for one that is more defensive.
There are a number of other areas where Wales’ creativity isn’t up there with the world’s best. This one clip from the start of the France game encapsulates some of these challenges, with Tipuric and Navidi making initial carries, before the ball goes wide:
Dan Biggar’s kick off was superbly well placed, allowing Wales to regain the ball, but we can see some of Wales’ problems in this clip, with forwards standing still taking ball, others going in to contact on their own, few options for Biggar and eventually Wales kick badly and lose possession.
If the kick had been accurate, Wales could have forced a turnover or penalty and the phase of play would have been a success. This shows that if a team is going to struggle to create opportunities, the kicking and pressure game must be accurate, otherwise the point scoring opportunities will dry up.
Do teams need to score tries?
Can Wales get through to the final without scoring many tries?
In the 2015 semi-finals, the two teams that didn’t score tries, lost (Argentina and South Africa). In 2011, Wales scored a single try against a tryless France, in their semi-final, but lost (due to the Warburton red card), while New Zealand scored a single try to beat a tryless Australia.
In 2007 the teams that scored the most tries in the semi-finals also progressed.
What does this mean for Wales?
Wales will not play as badly in the semi-final as they did against France. The Springboks are a power team, which suits Wales’ style, in that they can defend against straight running and a set piece, rather than pace and movement out wide.
Semi-finals have tended to be low scoring affairs, which again plays to Wales’ advantage, with their strong defensive game likely to be a major factor. It’s unlikely to be a high scoring game (based on past results), so a couple of tries should be enough to seal a victory (along with penalties and maybe the odd drop goal).
Even if Wales struggle to create many opportunities, this shouldn’t be a big factor in this semi-final. If they get to the final against New Zealand or England, then we may be looking at a different scenario.
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We all want to watch exciting rugby. Whether this be players offloading, backs running at pace and cutting great angles, or forwards working together in close driving pods. These sorts of tactics are great to watch, but they often aren’t the sorts of tactics that wins games.
Two of the most attractive teams to watch in this World Cup have been Japan and Australia and yet both of them crashed out of the tournament last weekend. For Japan, this has been an exceptional tournament and they have rightly been lauded for their approach to the game. In contrast, Australia return home having failed to reach their pre-tournament targets.
One thing they had in common on the weekend, was a willingness to run the ball and play phases from their own 22, which often resulted in them putting themselves under pressure, which led to the opposition scoring points.
The way the breakdown is refereed at the elite level, means the awarding of penalties for offences is a lottery. By playing multiple phases in their own 22, teams are increasing the chances of a ball handling error but also increasing the risk of the referee awarding a penalty against them at the breakdown, which will often lead to points being scored.
This isn’t to say that teams should just clear the ball at the first opportunity, but the risk should only be taken if there is a clear reward.
If a team can see they have a numerical advantage by moving the ball wide from deep, then by all means take the chance and move the ball. What teams shouldn’t do though is take the risk of multiple phases in their own 22, when the rewards are not clear and obvious.
In this article we will look at Japan’s errors early in the game against South Africa and revist Australia’s woeful deep play in their quarter final against England.
Japan v South Africa
The opening minutes of any game are crucial. If you can grab the initiative, through making big hits on the opposition or creating point scoring opportunities, this can often set the tone for the game as a whole. Think of Wales early points against Australia from the kick off as a good example.
Japan’s opening minute against South Africa set the tone, for all the wrong reasons, as we will see from the clip below. The thought process from the Japanese coaching team was obvious though – they wanted to take risks and try and move the point of attack to the wider channels.
This is what they opted to play on the kick return. Japan’s first receiver took the ball in to contact and after it was recycled they played the ball to their right:
This was a planned move. Japan’s inside centre (Nakamura) comes in to the first receiver channel, before passing to the playmaker Tamura to make the cross-field kick. We can also see that Japan have placed two of their back row players (Leitch and Labuschagne) in the wide channel to help with the next phase of play.
Japan got lucky. Matsushima could have been penalised for jumping in to the South African winger and when the ball bobbled free, it was a Japanese player who picked it up.
It was a very high risk strategy, but what was the reward on offer? The Springbok defence was organised and set, there was little space out wide and even if Matsushima had caught the ball, Mapimpi would have made a simple tackle.
It was a poorly thought out move, that didn’t stick to the risk-reward principles; there was far too much risk, for little potential reward.
Japan eventually clear the ball but just 2 minutes in to the game they have a lineout 30 metres out from their own line. They move the ball wide and then come back on the short side.
Tamura has plenty of time to put boot to ball and ease the pressure. Instead he throws a high risk pass, off his weak hand, which ends up drifting metres forward. Given the context of the game at that point, the difficulty of the pass and the potential upside (a hooker on the wing, with the ball 80 metres from the South Africa try line), this was the wrong option to play.
From the resulting scrum, some poor Japanese defence allows Mapimpi to cross for a try.
England v Australia
In our review article to this game, we highlighted how Australia like to play from deep through multiple phases and this was potentially an area England could capitalise on. It wasn’t a surprise therefore, to see Australia continue with this tactic and England profit from Australia’s mistakes.
With 12 minutes on the clock, England restart long and Australia’s number 8 (Isi Naisarani) takes the ball in to contact. After a strong tackle from Underhill, Australia reset and have the opportunity to kick the ball long.
Instead of that option, they do this:
Australia’s forwards come around the corner to take the ball and eventually their prop (Ala’alatoa drops the ball), giving England a great attacking scrum in front of the posts. Several phases later only some last ditch Australian tackling prevents England from scoring a try.
In our second clip we see England again restarting after a successful Australian penalty.
It’s the same pattern, as the initial carrier sets up a ruck before Australia’s forwards come around the corner and try and punch through the middle (making the angle for the clearing kick more difficult). This time Kurtley Beale decides to chip the ball out of his own 22 and straight in to the hands of May!
If the objective of Australia’s exit strategy is to heap as much pressure on themselves, then they are doing a good job!
On 33 minutes, Australia play 4 phases deep in their own 22 before deciding to make a clearing kick.
The final clip shows our now familiar Aussie clearing pattern, as a ruck is set up before Genia passes the ball in to midfield. This time they do attempt a clearing kick, but Lealiifano is under so much pressure, and is so far from the touchline that Hodge can just be bundled in to touch for an England lineout in an attacking position.
Getting the Risk v Reward balance right
If we look at these three Australian examples if their standard exit strategy it’s clear that they are high risk options, than ended up giving England good field position to attack from. What’s not clear is what the potential reward was?
A better kicking angle? A break from the forward carriers 90 metres from England’s line? The ability to make space for their backs to make a long range attack?
Who knows, but now Cheika has moved on from the Australia role, we expect to see this tactic quickly dropped as their default position.
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